For Humanitarian Reasons, U.S. and the West Should Welcome Russian Operatives and Russian Soldiers to Surrender, or to Defect, Escape Putin's Tyranny, and Seek Asylum; Financial Support Should Be Considered to Mitigate Individual Risk and Hardships, Especially If Russian Equipment Is Surrendered

It would seem as if an escalation of Russian aggression against Ukraine could result in a significant degradation of Russian military assets, through the destruction in combat of Russian military equipment and weaponry. To avoid added costs to Russian and Ukrainian lives, it would be better if Russian soldiers and operatives would simply surrender, or, perhaps even prior to an escalation of operations, defect and seek asylum.

Out of humanitarian concern for Russian and Ukrainian lives, as well as for a resulting contribution to world peace, Russian operatives, including special forces, as well as Russian soldiers generally, should be encouraged to defect or surrender and seek asylum in the West as an alternative to being led into disaster in an illegal and dangerous operation against Ukraine.

It appears that, with Ukraine having the right training, equipment, and informational support, an expansion of Russian aggression, such as with a broad, overt Russian military incursion, paradoxically would have the overall net effect of offering the opportunity for a significant degradation of Russian military assets.

Indeed, Russian naval forces in the Black Sea, including those illegally occupying Ukrainian ports that Russia originally agreed to lease, yet then essentially stole, also would be fair targets.

That especially is the case given the almost adolescent bluster of the Russian buildup, leaving little to the imagination, with massive formations of armaments in plain site, clustered together. If a large invasion commences, or even a supposed "minor incursion," there would be no need to limit a response to what happens strictly inside Ukraine's borders. All relevant assets could be wiped out, including those supporting the escalation, or poised to add to the escalation. Such a significant degradation of Russian assets would leave Russia even weaker than it now is.

However, while the destruction of invading Russian equipment, such as tanks, planes, transport, other equipment, and so forth, would be for the betterment of world peace in the long run, the human cost could be tragic. That cost would be needlessly tragic for both Russian and Ukrainian lives. The tragedy would be compounded by the fact that Russian soldiers are not directly responsible for the Kremlin's foolish strategic and tactical blunders.

Nor are they initially to blame for the crime of aggression that Vladimir Putin and Kremlin officials have been carrying out against Ukraine, a crime of aggression that would be magnified both in scope and legal culpability if the Russian aggression would now be expanded to some kind of massive overt invasion.

Russian operatives and soliders might not even be clearly aware of the added treaty violation at stake, the conniving ill repute of Russia having signed an international agreement to not violate Ukrainian territory, in exchange for Ukraine voluntarily giving up one of the world's most powerful nuclear arsenals, and then haplessly violate the aggrement with the Kremlin's illegal occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and hybrid operations in the Donbas.

One risk that would have to be encountered would be that of reprisals and assassinations against the Russians brave enough to seek asylum or surrender.

Given accusations against Russia of carrying out extraterritorial assassinations against their own people, such as former Russian spies, when defecting, one might speculate over whether soldiers who simply surrender would be branded double agents. There also might be concern over reprisals against families back home.

If special forces or operatives left to seek asylum, they presumably might encounter some of the same risks of other former Russian agents who sought freedom in the West.

That risk might be compounded if the easiest way to escape, as a practical logistical matter in mid-winter, was in Russian equipment.

On the other hand, the United States and its allies still should offer cash rewards for Russian equipment, in order to remove that equipment from combat, even if the equipment is later simply destroyed peacefully, for the sake of world peace and disarmament, once the asylum-seekers have reached safety in the hands of the West.

An added wrinkle is that, the more elite a Russian operative is, or the more elite or high-ranking a Russian soldier is, the more such a figure must have the knowledge, skills, and abilities, to be aware of Putin's less than competent "track record," the somewhat aimless folly of Putin's Ukraine debacle, and that Putin would be endangering their lives needlessly.

For one thing, they are finding themselves being a part of a national humiliation of scrapping for small pieces of coastline on an inland sea, where the inland sea itself is nearly landlocked, save for a chokepoint straddled by NATO. One reason that minimal access to an inland sea is so important to the Kremlin is that, while large in land mass, Russia is geographically handicapped by being nearly landlocked on two sides, and nearly icelocked part of the year on another side.

Russia has what presumably is the world's longest Pacific Ocean coastline, yet through the epic incompetence of their failed national leadership, they have never developed themselves as a true Pacific power, and have largely sat out the explosive vitality of the Pacific Rim as an economic hub across the past half-century.

By contrast, in the United States, as important as the East Coast and Europe have been to America, the United States also has robustly developed its Pacific Coast, and interior, and has long been both a strong Pacific power and economically the most vital participant in the thriving Pacific Rim.

Meanwhile, in contrast, failed national leadership by the Kremlin leaves the Red Army and special operatives needlessly being put at risk as the Kremlin looks more like a petty medieval fiefdom scrapping for some bits of coastline on an inland sea.

An added question could be whether Russian asylum-seekers surrender not just equipment but information. The sharing of information for the sake of world peace could be especially key if they have information relating to legal culpability for Putin or other high-ranking officials. For example, if there are operative who can detail fraudulent schemes, such as using suspected plans for false flag operations as an excuse for the crime of aggression, or chicanery relating to the seizing and illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory on the Crimean Peninsula or the Donbas, and if those details help substantiate criminal prosecution of particular high-ranking officials, all the more helpful the information would be to world peace and the future of a free and prosperous Russia.

Now, great care would have to be taken to filter out another kind of "false flag" operation, any Kremlin-directed effort to deploy operatives in the guise of would-be defectors or asylum-seekers, with the Kremlin intending them to carry out missions for the Kremlin, and get their hands on any cash support offered. Of course, one "calling card" of authenticity would be if the defecting asylum-seeker brought equipment and information with him.

Either way, a dramatic escalation of Russian aggression should provide an opportunity to see a radical degradation of Russian military assets. If that happens due to defections and surrenders, the needless cost to Russian and Ukrainian lives would be far lower than if the inanimate Russian military assets were destroyed because the Kremlin tried to victimize its own soldiers and operatives by forcing them into needless illegal combat.

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Key Words: Ukraine, Britain, UK, Arms, Military, Defensive Weapons, Russia

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